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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Among other things, the Utah Law Review symposium, “The Bystander 
Dilemma: The Holocaust, War Crimes, and Sexual Assault,” addresses the legal 
consequences of failure to act in the face of atrocity. The topic inspires a variety of 
questions: Who is a bystander? What makes one a bystander? When one witnesses 
atrocity does a legal duty attach that requires action? What are the consequences 
for the bystander or the observer, if one fails to act? Or simply chooses not to act? 
Are criminal sanctions available to address such failures or choices? Are criminal 
sanctions appropriate? Are existing modes of individual responsibility adequate for 
holding someone accountable for their failure or choice not to act? If not, is a new 
mode of liability required? And if it is, what acts or omissions and what levels of 
knowledge and intent will be enough to hold a person criminally liable for his or 
her inaction in the face of atrocity? What justifications might excuse inaction? 
Though not relevant to the question of guilt, what will aggravate or mitigate the 
punishment of one who is found guilty of being a bystander to atrocity under this 
new mode of liability?  
The theme of the symposium is not entirely new. Neither are the questions. 
Writers and scholars have approached the failure to act in the face of atrocity in a 
variety of ways. Anthropologists, historians, ethicists, theologians, political and 
moral philosophers, novelists, among others, have taken up the topic and offered 
their own explanations and answers. Karl Jaspers, for example, confronted the 
moral dilemma of inaction in the face of atrocity for a generation of Germans in 
the lectures he delivered in 1945 on German guilt.1 More recently, historian and 
political scientist Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, indirectly addressed the questions 
raised here in his book “Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the 
Holocaust.”2 
                                                
*	© 2017 David Schwendiman. Mr. Schwendiman is the Specialist (Chief) Prosecutor 
of the Kosovo Specialist Prosecutor’s Office in The Hague, The Netherlands. The Kosovo 
Specialist Prosecutor’s Office is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of 
atrocity committed during the 1998 to 2000 war fought over the independence of Kosovo. 
Mr. Schwendiman is also an Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of Utah S.J. 
Quinney College of Law. The views expressed by the author are entirely his own. They are 
not those of the Kosovo Specialist Prosecutor’s Office. The author is a Senior Foreign 
Service Officer assigned to the Kosovo Specialist Prosecutor’s Office. The article has not 
been approved by the United States Department of State. Nothing in the article represents 
an official position of the Department of State or the United States government.				
1 KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT (E.B. Ashton trans., Fordham 
University Press 2d ed. 2001). 
2 DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY 
GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (First Vintage Books 1997). Goldhagen focuses primarily 
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From a legal point of view, the symposium’s theme suggests that a new mode 
of liability is required to extend individual responsibility for crime further than is 
currently the case. The question is: is that defensible? is it necessary or wise?  
For a practitioner charged with investigating and prosecuting atrocity crimes,3 
the question is more practical than it is theoretical. With that in mind, I choose to 
                                                
on those who did the work of the Holocaust; that is, those who executed the plans to kill; 
“ordinary” Germans who did the killing. Since his subjects killed with knowledge and 
intent and were not simply observers who failed to act to prevent killing, they could not in 
any formulation be considered “bystanders.” They were “direct perpetrators” under any 
recognizable conception of criminal liability. Nonetheless, his treatment of the origins of 
the thinking and circumstances that brought “ordinary” Germans to a point that when the 
historic opportunity presented itself they were not only able but motivated to kill Jews is 
instructive as an extreme study of how levels of culpability for atrocity can be evaluated. 
Where does the “bystander” who shared that thinking, did no killing, knew it was 
happening or suspected it, but did nothing to interfere with it, fit?  
3 I choose to use the phrase “atrocity crimes,” as coined by Ambassador David 
Scheffer in his 2012 book, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE WAR 
CRIMES TRIBUNALS (2012), for economy and convenience rather than referring to “war 
crimes” or “crimes against humanity,” or the crime of “genocide,” or general collective 
terms such as “international criminal law,” “international humanitarian law,” or 
“international human rights law.” According to Ambassador Scheffer, the term “atrocity 
crimes” describes “megacrimes” that may be “war crimes,” or “crimes against humanity,” 
or even “genocide,” given the circumstances, or may be violations of conventions or norms 
covered by the larger collective terms. What sets them apart is they occur under 
circumstances that attract significant attention and cause the international community to 
react to them: 
 
The simple reality is that until the atrocity crime reaches a high level of killing, 
wounding, or property destruction that decimates a society, tribunals will not 
prosecute the crime and the international community typically will not react to 
it. 
  
Id., at 430.  
Ambassador Scheffer summarizes his definition of “atrocity crimes” as follows: 
 
In short, these are high-impact crimes of severe gravity that are of an 
orchestrated character, shock the conscience of humankind, result in a 
significant number of victims or large-scale property damage, and merit 
international response to hold at least the top war criminals accountable. 
 
Id., at 429–30. 
I am aware that by adopting this construction for economy and convenience I may be 
distorting the discussion a bit. Those who perpetrate crimes in the manner and on the scale 
contemplated by Ambassador Scheffer are clearly not “bystanders” by any definition. The 
direct question the essay asks is can one be prosecuted who merely knows of a crime or 
witnesses it as it is being committed, knows what is happening, knows it is part of a much 
larger set of crimes amounting to atrocity according to Ambassador Scheffer’s definition, 
but does nothing to interfere with it, has no duty as a commander to intervene, may be 
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address the subject as a prosecutor, not as a scholar. I do so to caution against 
stretching individual responsibility for crime to cover the acts or lack of action of 
those who are mere observers, including, as a practical matter, many who must be 
relied upon as witnesses.  
Fundamentally, promoting a new mode of liability that suggests a mere 
“bystander,” regardless how morally or ethically reprehensible his or her conduct 
might be under the circumstances, ought to be prosecuted for doing nothing—
without more—threatens to encourage expectations in victims that will not be met. 
Hard experience has taught us that the resources, the will, and the patience of the 
victims, survivors and domestic and international support for the effort will not be 
there in the end if it tries to roam that widely or penetrate that deeply into the 
landscape of atrocity regardless how badly well-meaning, or not so well-meaning 
defenders of the effort might want it to. Introducing such expectations into the 
criminal justice process without a realistic possibility of meeting them will only 
compound the difficulty of achieving and preserving the legitimacy of the 
outcomes in atrocity prosecutions. Any expectation attached to atrocity prosecution 
must be managed well and managed successfully. 
This Article examines and expands on this thesis by first addressing why we 
prosecute atrocity crime; that is, why a criminal justice approach has been favored 
in the past for holding people accountable for their misconduct, particularly during 
or in connection with conflict. I offer my reflections on the question rather than 
commentary on what I know of the thoughtful and extensive writing that has been 
done on the subject.4 My reflections are based on my experience as a war crimes 
investigator and prosecutor and as an executive prosecutor responsible for 
overseeing the investigation and prosecution of atrocity crimes. They are colored 
and limited, of course, by the conflict with which I am most familiar; the conflict 
that came with the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, including the struggle that 
preceded and followed when Kosovo broke away from Serbia in 1998, 1999, and 
2000.  
Next, I address the question of legitimacy; what I believe it means based on 
my experience as a war crimes prosecutor, executive prosecutor, and as an 
observer of justice systems in Afghanistan and elsewhere; and why I believe 
achieving legitimacy and the perception of legitimacy among those affected by 
atrocity prosecutions are the central challenges faced by the most recent efforts to 
hold people accountable for their conduct in conflict. I contend that expanding 
modes of liability for individual responsibility for that conduct is unwise because 
                                                
powerless to interfere in any case, but is nonetheless present or on notice? The larger issue 
is whether holding out the possibility of being able to prosecute someone in that situation 
does more damage than good for the future of atrocity crimes prosecution as a whole. It is 
in this context and as a general description of the kinds of investigations and prosecutions I 
have been part of that I feel comfortable using Ambassador Scheffer’s term.  
4 See, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS (1993); 
SCHEFFER, supra note 3; LARRY MAY, AFTER THE WAR ENDS: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
PERSPECTIVE (2012); cf. DAVID RIEFF, IN PRAISE OF FORGETTING: HISTORICAL MEMORY 
AND ITS IRONIES (2016). 
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of the potential it has for inadvertently compromising the legitimacy and, more 
importantly, whether those affected by the outcomes of atrocity prosecutions see 
those outcomes as legitimate. If the efforts of those engaged in atrocity prosecution 
do not deliver outcomes that are perceived as legitimate by those they affect, the 
outcomes will likely be difficult to enforce and will do little to address the root 
causes of the conflicts that provided the opportunity for atrocity. In this regard, 
atrocity prosecution is unique.  
Unrealistic expectations, expectations that cannot be met when it comes to 
atrocity prosecutions, are a major source of this threat. This Article discusses the 
critical need to manage expectations associated with atrocity prosecution. It looks 
at some of the means devised and used in the past to manage the unique situations 
and expectations with which I am familiar. It examines their relevance to current 
and future efforts to hold people accountable for atrocity crimes.  
As I noted earlier, I have chosen to approach the subject of the symposium as 
a prosecutor. For that reason, the Article concludes by addressing some of the 
practical proof problems I believe argue against expanding existing modes of 
liability for prosecuting atrocity. One of the most obvious is that “bystanders” are 
often a primary source of direct evidence of the crime base and of evidence of 
individual liability in any atrocity prosecution, however reluctant they may be to 
participate in an investigation or testify in a prosecution. Adding potential criminal 
liability to the reasons they will assert for not giving evidence is not helpful.  
 
II.  FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 
 
The invitation to participate in the symposium and reduce to writing some 
thoughts on the “bystander dilemma” and its implications gives me as a 
practitioner a rare opportunity to reflect not only on the legal and technical issues 
raised by the subject, but also to examine some fundamental questions that 
surround them. It gives me the chance, for example, to consider independently 
from my duties and responsibilities as a chief prosecutor for a tribunal newly 
established to address accountability for conduct committed in conflict in the 
Balkans in 1998, 1999, and 2000,5 and why we go to the considerable expense and 
                                                
5 See Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, art. 162 (10). 
 
To comply with its international obligations in relation to the Council of Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly Report Doc 12462 of 7 January 2011, the Republic of 
Kosovo may establish Specialist Chambers and a Specialist Prosecutor’s Office 
within the justice system of Kosovo. The organisation, functioning and 
jurisdiction of the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office shall 
be regulated by this Article and by a specific law. 
 
See also Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, Law No. 05/L-
053 (05 August 2015), art. 1(2). 
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effort of prosecuting atrocity crimes at all. Why do we use up great stores of 
political and diplomatic capital to make it possible to prosecute atrocity crimes? 
Why do we expend great sums of money to finance investigations, build 
infrastructure, staff prosecutor’s offices and courts, and provide money for 
prosecuting and defending atrocity crimes? Why do international and regional 
organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union risk prestige and 
credibility by involving themselves in the prosecution of atrocity crime? Is there 
value in holding people individually accountable for atrocity crimes? 
If prosecuting those responsible for atrocity is deemed worth the expense, the 
energy and the political will it takes to do it, the commitment must be reasonable, 
but unequivocal. Further, the outcomes must be achieved by legitimate means; that 
is, by institutions and actors and through processes that meet international 
                                                
Specialist Chambers within the Kosovo justice system and the Specialist 
Prosecutor’s Office are necessary to fulfil the international obligations 
undertaken in Law No. 04/L-274, to guarantee the protection of the fundamental 
rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, 
and to ensure secure, independent, impartial, fair and efficient criminal 
proceedings in relation to allegations of grave trans-boundary and international 
crimes committed during and in the aftermath of the conflict in Kosovo, which 
relate to those reported in the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 
Report Doc 12462 of 7 January 2011 (“The Council of Europe Assembly 
Report”) and which have been the subject of criminal investigation by the 
Special Investigative Task Force (“SITF”) of the Special Prosecution Office of 
the Republic of Kosovo (“SPRK”).  
 
Chapter III of the Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office limits the 
jurisdiction of Chambers and the mandate of the Specialist Prosecutor to “crimes set out in 
Articles 12-16 which relate to the Council of Europe Assembly Report [“Marty Report”].” 
The crimes set out in Articles 12 through 16 of the law are “Crimes Against Humanity 
Under International Law” (Article 13), “War Crimes Under International Law” (Article 
14), the substantive criminal laws in force in Kosovo during the “temporal jurisdiction of 
the Specialist Chambers” (1998, 1999, 2000); that is, the Criminal Code of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1976), the Criminal Law of the Socialist Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo (1977), any more lenient substantive criminal law in force between 
1989 and 2000, and a variety of crimes in the Kosovo Criminal Code that address matters 
affecting the integrity of judicial proceedings (e.g. bribery) (Article 15). The law also 
requires the Specialist Chambers to apply “customary international law” as well as the 
substantive law just described. (Article 12) Chambers is permitted to determine “customary 
international law” by resorting to “sources of international law, including subsidiary 
sources such as the jurisprudence from the international ad hoc tribunals, the International 
Criminal Court and other criminal courts.” (Article 3(3)). As noted, the temporal 
jurisdiction of the Chambers defined in Article 7 of the law to reach acts committed in or 
affecting the territory of Kosovo in 1998, 1999, and 2000 (i.e. “The Specialist Chambers 
shall have jurisdiction over crimes within its subject matter jurisdiction which occurred 
between 1 January 1998 and 31 December 2000.”).  
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standards.6 More importantly, the institutions, actors, processes and outcomes must 
be perceived and accepted as legitimate by those they affect; a much more difficult 
challenge. Whatever the intention, whatever the cost, if this challenge is not met, 
true success is unlikely.  
What the limits of the criminal sanction are in the case of atrocity crime,7 the 
expectations raised by the means that are available to investigate and prosecute 
atrocity crime, (specifically in the case of this Article), the existing modes of 
liability I have to work with,8 and the problems related to managing those 
                                                
6 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights; European Convention on Human 
Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Mount Scopus International 
Standards of Judicial Independence (2008/2015); UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND 
CRIME, COMPENDIUM OF UNITED NATIONS STANDARDS AND NORMS IN CRIME PREVENTION 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (United Nations 2016). 
7 See, e.g., Herbert L. Packer, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 72 (1968). 
Professor Packer’s book was published well before the creation of the ICTY and the ICC. 
He does not discuss the application of criminal sanctions in cases of atrocity, but his 
treatment of culpability as the principal limiting factor in his description of the minimal 
doctrinal content of criminal law is as relevant to the discussion of “bystander” culpability 
as it is to the development of his thesis, the “prudential limits of the criminal law,” which 
he calls the “main concern” of the book.  
8 Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, Law No. 05/L-053 
(05 August 2015) art. 16(1)(a) provides: 
 
a person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and 
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of such crime shall be 
individually responsible for the crime. 
 
Article 12 of the special law directs the “Specialist Chambers” to apply customary 
international law applicable at the time crimes were committed “in accordance with Article 
7(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 
15(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as incorporated and 
protected by Articles 19(2), 22(2), 22(3) and 33(1) of the Constitution.” Article 3(3) allows 
the judges to look to “sources of international law, including subsidiary sources such as the 
jurisprudence from the international ad hoc tribunals, the International Criminal Court and 
other criminal courts” to determine what customary international law is in that regard. For 
these reasons, it is useful to help sort out what the existing modes of liability in atrocity 
crimes prosecutions are to briefly examine the jurisprudence of the ICTY, the ICTR, and 
that of other special tribunals and domestic courts that have dealt with the substantive law 
the new special courts will be using, as well as commentary and other “sources” 
traditionally considered authoritative.  
The Kosovo provision on individual responsibility is virtually identical to Article 7(1) 
of the Statute of the ICTY: 
 
A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and 
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in 
articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the 
crime.  
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Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute, is similar, but expands on the definition of individual 
responsibility that applies in cases brought before the ICC: 
 
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and 
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that 
person:  
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another 
or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is 
criminally responsible;  
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in 
fact occurs or is attempted;  
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, 
abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, 
including providing the means for its commission; 
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted 
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common 
purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:  
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or 
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose 
involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court; or  
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to 
commit the crime;  
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites 
others to commit genocide;  
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its 
execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur 
because of circumstances independent of the person’s intentions. 
However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or 
otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for 
punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that 
person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose. 
 
See WOMEN’S INITIATIVE FOR GENDER JUSTICE, EXPERT PAPER NO. 1, MODES OF 
LIABILITY, November 2013, http://iccwomen.org/documents/Modes-of-Liability.pdf, 
accessed on January 5, 2017. A thorough examination of “co-perpetration” as a mode of 
liability acknowledged by the ICC as permitted by Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute. 
“Joint criminal enterprise” as interpreted by the ICC.  
The Kosovo special law, the Statute of the ICTY, and the Rome Statute all address 
the concept of command responsibility in virtually the same way. See Article 16(1)(c) and 
(d), Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, Law No. 05/L-053 (05 
August 2015); Article 7(3) and (4), Statute of the ICTY; Article 28, Rome Statute. 
With the exception of its treatment of joint criminal enterprise as a “commission” 
mode of liability, the jurisprudence of the ICTY is relatively settled regarding what is 
covered by Article 7(1): 
 
• Planning, see, e.g., Kordic and Cerkez (Trial Chamber), February 26, 2001, 
para. 386 (“. . . an accused may be held criminally responsible for planning 
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alone.”); Kordic and Cerkez (Appeals Chamber), December 17, 2004, para. 26 
(“The actus reus of ‘planning’ requires one or more persons design the criminal 
conduct constituting one or more statutory crimes that are later perpetrated.”); 
Kordic and Cerkez (Appeals Chamber), December 17, 2004, para. 31 (“[I]n 
relation to ‘planning,’ a person who plans an act or omission with the awareness 
of the substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of 
that plan, has the requisite mens rea for establishing responsibility under Article 
7(1) of the Statute pursuant to planning. Planning with such awareness has to be 
regarded as accepting that crime.”); Kordic and Cerkez (Appeals Chamber), 
December 17, 2004, para. 26 (“It is sufficient to demonstrate that the planning 
was a factor substantially contributing to such criminal conduct.”).  
• Instigating, see, e.g., Kordic and Cerkez (Appeals Chamber), December 17, 
2004, para. 27 (“The actus reus of ‘instigating’ means to prompt another person 
to commit an offence.”); Galic (Trial Chamber), December 5, 2003, para. 168 
(‘“Instigating’ means prompting another to commit an offence, which is actually 
committed.”); Brdjanin (Trial Chamber), September 1, 2004, para. 269 (“The 
nexus between instigation and perpetration requires proof. It is not necessary to 
demonstrate that the crime would not have been perpetrated without the 
accused’s involvement; it is sufficient to prove that the instigation was a factor 
clearly contributing to the conduct of other persons committing the crime in 
question.”); Limaj et al. (Trial Chamber), November 30, 2005, para. 514 (“Both 
acts and omissions may constitute instigating, which covers express and implied 
conduct.”); Galic (Trial Chamber), December 5, 2003, para. 168 (“It has been 
held in relation to ‘instigating’ that omissions amount to instigation in 
circumstances where a commander has created an environment permissive of 
criminal behavior by subordinates.”); Kordic and Cerkez (Appeals Chamber), 
December 17, 2004, para. 32 (“With respect to ‘instigating,’ a person who 
instigates another person to commit an act or omission with the awareness of the 
substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of that 
instigation, has the requisite mens rea for establishing responsibility under 
Article 7(1) of the Statute pursuant to instigating. Instigating with such 
awareness has to be regarded as accepting that crime.”).  
• Ordering, see, e.g., Kordic and Cerkez (Appeals Chamber), December 17, 
2004, para. 28 (“The actus reus of ‘ordering’ means that a person in a position 
of authority instructs another person to commit an offence”); Kordic and Cerkez 
(Appeals Chamber), December 17, 2004, para. 28 (“A formal superior-
subordinate relationship between the accused and the perpetrator is not 
required.”); Blaskic (Trial Chamber), March 3, 2000, para. 282 (“[A]n order 
does not need to be given by the superior directly to the person(s) who 
perform(s) the actus reus of the offence.”); Blaskic (Trial Chamber), March 3, 
2000, para. 281 (The order “can be explicit or implicit.”); Strugar (Trial 
Chamber), January 31, 2005, para. 232 (“As this form of liability is closely 
associated with ‘instigating,’ subject to the additional requirement that the 
person ordering the commission of a crime have authority over the person 
physically perpetrating the offence, a causal link between the act of ordering 
and the physical perpetration of a crime, analogous to that which is required for 
instigating, also needs to be demonstrated as part of the actus reus of ordering. 
The Chamber further accepts that, similar to instigating, this link need not be 
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such as to show that the offence would not have been perpetrated in the absence 
of the order.”); Kordic and Cerkez (Appeals Chamber), December 17, 2004, 
para. 30 “[T]he Appeals Chamber held that a person who orders an act or 
omission with the awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime will be 
committed in the execution of that order, has the requisite mens rea for 
establishing responsibility under Article 7(1) of the Statute pursuant to ordering. 
Ordering with such awareness has to be regarded as accepting that crime.”). 
• Committing, see, e.g., Galic (Trial Chamber), December 5, 2003, para. 168 
(‘“Committing’ means that an ‘accused participated, physically or otherwise 
directly, in the material elements of a crime under the Tribunal’s Statute.’ Thus, 
it ‘covers first and foremost the physical perpetration of a crime by the offender 
himself.’”); Krstic (Trial Chamber), August 2, 2001, para. 601 (‘“Committing’ 
covers physically perpetrating a crime or engendering a culpable omission in 
violation of criminal law.”); Kvocka et al. (Trial Chambers), November 2, 2001, 
para. 251 (“The requisite mens rea [for committing a crime] is that, as in other 
forms of criminal participation under Article 7(1), the accused acted in the 
awareness of a substantial likelihood that a criminal act or omission would 
occur as a consequence of his conduct.”). 
The ICTY considers joint criminal enterprise (JCE) to be one form of 
“commission” liability under Article 7(1). See, e.g., Stakic (Trial Chamber), July 
31, 2003, paras. 438, 528 (“The Trial Chamber emphasizes that joint criminal 
enterprise is only one of several possible interpretations of the term 
‘commission’ under Article 7(1) of the Statute and that other definitions of co-
perpetration must equally be taken into account. Furthermore, a more direct 
reference to ‘commission’ in its traditional sense should be given priority before 
considering responsibility under the judicial term ‘joint criminal enterprise.’”). 
This essay is not intended as a thorough examination of these modes of liability, 
as settled or as, in the case of JCE-3, controversial as they are or are likely to be 
in future. Neither is it an examination of how the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) has dealt with the question of conspiracy in its practice. Safe to say that 
JCE in any of its three generally understood forms, whether one accepts any or 
all of them as viable and useable modes of liability for purposes of prosecuting 
atrocity crime or not, requires proof of more than mere observation and failure 
to act. A JCE theory of liability would not be used to deal with mere 
“bystanders.”  
• Aiding and abetting is considered by the ICTY to be a form of accessory 
liability. See Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic (Trial Chamber), February 22, 2001, 
para. 391 (“As opposed to the ‘commission’ of a crime, aiding and abetting is a 
form of accessory liability.”). As to the elements, see, e.g., Blaskic (Appeals 
Chamber), July 29, 2004, para. 46 (“In this case, the Trial Chamber, following 
the standard set out in Furundzjia, held that the actus reus of aiding and abetting 
‘consists of practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a 
substantial effect of the perpetration of the crime.’ . . . The Appeals Chamber 
considers that the Trial Chamber was correct in so holding.”); Simic, Tadic and 
Zaric (Trial Chamber), October 17, 2003, para. 162 (“The actus reus of aiding 
and abetting may be perpetrated through an omission, based on a duty to act, 
provided that the failure to act had a substantial effect on the commission of the 
crime and that it was coupled with the requisite mens rea.”); Blaskic (Trial 
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expectations need to be carefully examined in order to better understand how they 
affect the outcomes and the perceptions of those affected by them.  
 
III.  WHY PROSECUTE ATROCITY CRIME? 
 
Contemplating creation of a bystander mode of criminal liability for atrocity 
crimes does not call into question the need, or even the advisability, of prosecuting 
those responsible for atrocity crimes. Accountability has value regardless. Simply, 
committing atrocity crimes must have consequences for those responsible 
notwithstanding the mode of liability used. At its core, the reason for spending the 
time, effort, and treasure to prosecute atrocity crimes is captured in this verse from 
“The Rose Garden” in which Sheikh Saadi reflects on the character and conduct of 
kings. In the story a dervish gives advice, a warning, to an unjust Arab king who 
comes upon the dervish in a mosque at Damascus. The dervish tells him to treat his 
subjects more justly, then offers this: 
 
The human race is made up of men 
all created from the one source. 
                                                
Chamber), March 3, 2000, para. 284, (The failure to act must have a “decisive 
effect” on the commission of the crime.); Blaskic (Appeals Chamber), July 29, 
2004, para. 45 (“In Vasiljevic, the Appeals Chamber set out the . . . mens rea of 
aiding and abetting. It stated: . . . In the case of aiding and abetting, the requisite 
mental element is knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor 
assist [in] the commission of the specific crime of the principal. . .”); Strugar 
(Trial Chamber), January 31, 2005, para. 350 (“Regarding the requisite mens 
rea, it must be established that the aider and abettor was aware that his acts were 
assisting in the commission of the crime by the principal. This awareness need 
not have been explicitly expressed, but it may be inferred from all relevant 
circumstances.”). 
With regard to whether it is enough to merely be present at the scene of a 
crime to be found to be an aider and abettor, see Limaj et al., (Trial Chamber), 
November 30, 2005, para. 517 (“While each case turns on its own facts, mere 
presence at the scene of a crime will not usually constitute aiding or abetting. 
However, where the presence bestows legitimacy on, or provides 
encouragement to, the actual perpetrator, that may be sufficient.”); Vasiljevic 
(Trial Chamber), November 29, 2002, para. 70 (“Mere presence at the scene of 
the crime is not conclusive of aiding and abetting unless it is demonstrated to 
have a significant encouraging effect on the principal offender.”); Aleksovski 
(Trial Chamber), June 25, 1999, para. 64 (“Mere presence constitutes sufficient 
participation under some circumstance so long as it was proved that the 
presence had a significant effect on the commission of the crime by promoting it 
and that the person present had the required mens rea.”). 
 
See also GUENAEL METTRAUX, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS 
279–93 (2006); GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 116–27 
(2005). 
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If one man feel pain, the others, 
from the same source, cannot be  
indifferent to it. 
You, who are unmoved by others’ 
suffering, are not entitled to the  
name of man!9  
 
Holding a person accountable for causing the suffering of others is the human 
thing to do.  
The goal of holding those responsible for atrocity crime accountable in a 
criminal trial, from a practical standpoint, cannot be to achieve a political outcome 
or to vindicate, defend, dismantle or correct a particular political or historical 
narrative associated with conflict. It must simply be to make those responsible for 
atrocity answer for their crimes and suffer appropriate punishment as a 
consequence.  
There is the potential, however, for investigations and prosecutions of atrocity 
to produce a record that will affect the history of the conflict and the period and 
context in which it occurred; facts that have the potential to change the way that 
events and the people involved in conflict are understood. Criminal trials and 
guilty pleas can help correct the historical record, shape new narratives, debunk 
revisionism, and foster common understanding that reduces the likelihood of future 
conflict. In this way, perhaps, atrocity prosecutions help to make it possible for 
victims, survivors and perpetrators alike to begin to live with the past rather than 
be trapped by narratives that condemn them to live in the past. 
Prosecution of atrocity crimes is unlikely, except in the most indirect way, to 
compensate victims for their losses, even when there is an obligation on the part of 
the prosecutor and court to provide means for victims to obtain reparations from 
the perpetrators.10 Neither is it going to take back the beatings nor restore lost 
lives. Prosecuting atrocity crimes cannot restore the victims back to where they 
were before what was done to them.   
The very act of investigating and then prosecuting atrocity crime, however, 
may prevent further suffering or additional damage from being done to victims and 
survivors.  
Conversely, investigating and prosecuting atrocity crimes when perpetrators 
are at large and still in control of some areas or aspects of conflict, if the effort is 
taken seriously by those likely to be subjects of the investigations and 
                                                
9 SHEIKH MUSLIHUDDIN SAADI SHIRAZI, THE ROSE GARDEN (GULISTAN) 33 (Omar 
Ali-Shah trans., Tractus Books 1997). 
10 See, e.g., art. 2 (Right to Life) and art. 13 (Right to an Effective Remedy), The 
European Convention on Human Rights; see also, art. 193, Criminal Procedure Code, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (2003) (i.e., “(1) A claim under property law that has arisen 
because of the commission of a criminal offense shall be deliberated on the motion of 
authorized officials in criminal proceedings if this would not considerably prolong such 
proceedings. (2) A claim under property law may pertain to reimbursement of damage, 
recovery of items, or annulment of a particular legal transaction.”). 
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prosecutions, and there is a real possibility that they will be held accountable, may 
lead to greater atrocity and greater suffering, as the offenders attempt to get rid of 
evidence and eliminate or silence witnesses.  
It is possible that in addition to having forensic value, a humanitarian benefit 
will derive from the collection and analysis of evidence of atrocity if it leads to 
locating, recovering and identifying the dead. Families may be re-united with those 
they lost, for example. In some small way, doubts and the daily terror that comes 
from not knowing might be resolved. Victims of mass murder often go nameless: 
their individuality lost. Locating, recovering, and identifying the dead may also 
bring a measure of dignity to those who were murdered by giving them back their 
identities, by restoring their names, by seeing them again as people rather than 
nameless numbers.  
Restoring or protecting the dignity of those who have suffered is a worthy 
byproduct of atrocity prosecution regardless whether it deters or prevents present 
or future crimes. Giving evidence at trial, having a chance to speak publicly about 
what happened to them, facing their tormentors in a public place, in a courtroom 
where the accused no longer have control over anything and can do no further 
harm to those they victimized, may return some control to the lives of those from 
whom control was taken when atrocity was committed. Participating in a 
prosecution may, for some, provide a means for expiating survivors’ guilt.  
One of the assumptions made when civilian criminal trials are chosen as the 
way to deal with allegations of atrocity is that subjecting them to the rigorous 
demands of a criminal trial will clear the air for reconciliation. Another is that such 
allegations can be addressed in criminal trials in ways that promote and maintain 
stability in the places where conflict occurred. It is further assumed that addressing 
atrocity in this way, fixing responsibility by making people answer criminal 
charges and depriving them of their liberty or administering other punishments if 
they are found guilty, will lead to greater security and stability and help advance 
development in the places that are affected both by the conflict and by the 
aftermath. In this reading, there can be no “reconciliation” without accountability, 
without correcting narratives or reconciling them so they no longer aggravate the 
sentiments that bred conflict and might eventually lead to renewed violence. And 
all of that, by this logic, is done to some extent (one worth the time, energy, 
political capital, and resources it takes to do it properly) by a criminal trial.  
There is, however, no clear body of empirical evidence or scholarship that 
answers whether holding people accountable for atrocity crimes achieves, truly 
promotes or preserves stability or security during conflict or in a post-conflict 
state.11 In fact, the result may be just the opposite, at least in the short term. In 
cases of international and regional intervention in armed conflict, efforts to save 
lives, stop uncontrollable displacement, dislocation and mass migration, and to put 
an end to fighting by political means, are often complicated by questions of how to 
deal with atrocity committed in connection with the conflict.  
                                                
11 See DAVID RIEFF, IN PRAISE OF FORGETTING: HISTORICAL MEMORY AND ITS 
IRONIES (2016).  
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Interventions in cases of atrocity are fraught political endeavors even when 
they are undertaken to address humanitarian crises and regardless whether they 
involve the use of military force. As a consequence, diplomats and politicians may 
prefer to avoid addressing responsibility for atrocity in negotiations to end conflict 
in favor of stopping the fighting and ameliorating its affects. They may consider 
the prospect of atrocity prosecutions an unwelcome and nettlesome distraction. 
This is partly because ending the fighting, saving lives, stopping dislocation and 
mass migration, and beginning the process of achieving political settlement almost 
invariably and unavoidably involves making peace with or even making allies of 
people who are known to have committed atrocity or who have enriched 
themselves corruptly during and as part of the conflict.  
Negotiators may want to sideline discussion of atrocity because the states they 
represent deliberately chose to ignore the conduct of allies or sponsored actors 
during conflict in order to give them time and space to achieve certain tactical or 
strategic objectives the intervenors favored. Intervenors themselves may have 
engaged in conduct that could be considered marginally culpable. It may be 
embarrassing for intervenors to acknowledge atrocity that occurred in areas for 
which they were notionally or practically responsible if they were unable to stop 
what they could do little to control.   
Complicating all of this is the fact that people who are part of the political, 
military, and power elite on all sides of a conflict (often with the help or 
encouragement of international or regional sponsors) strive to position themselves 
to protect their gains, recoup their losses, and acquire a say in the resolution of 
conflict that will advance their self-interest and will insist on significant post-
conflict leadership roles, including major roles in government, as a condition of 
their participation in any peace process.  
Regardless, whether they are forced to acknowledge the level of atrocity 
engaged in by parties to a conflict, the desire to achieve a political settlement on 
the part of the states that intervene bodes ill for negotiators taking hard positions 
with regard to accountability in talks to end conflict.  
The goal of any political settlement is to achieve security and restore stability 
to an affected state or region so intervention can end and recovery can begin. The 
looming specter of atrocity prosecution is an unwelcome interloper when it comes 
to the diplomacy required to achieve such a settlement. Negotiators may talk about 
accountability, but their true focus will be on what needs to be done to stop the 
killing, staunch the bleeding, and end forced dislocation and mass migration. This 
is so the process of putting the pieces back together again, something that will 
allow the intervenors to withdraw.  
Considerable public sentiment is often marshaled in support of this kind of 
approach because stopping the bloodshed and dislocation, something that is widely 
and vividly reported on a daily basis in the world media, becomes a practical, 
political, and moral imperative.  
In states that intervene, domestic impatience with the cost of an intervention, 
in casualties as well as treasure, drives intervenors to want to disengage as soon as 
possible. So, while accountability for atrocity may come up during negotiations, 
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rarely is it taken seriously by those who worry that discussion of atrocity will 
derail the path to settlement and disengagement.  
Accountability is left for another, more settled time—a time that in nearly 
every case never comes or comes many years later when dealing effectively with 
the cases is extremely difficult and costly if not practically impossible.  
Investigating and prosecuting perpetrators of atrocity crime who occupy 
positions of influence and control, and threaten the resolution of conflict and long-
term stability, however, may be one way to dislodge them or neutralize them, even 
if they are still in power, to allow an end to conflict. If this is done, it must be done 
legitimately (i.e. without political influence or improper interference; by 
independent prosecutors and judges acting according to facts carefully collected 
and tested and their best, most well-informed reading and understanding of 
applicable law; without fear or favor) and must achieve results that are both 
legitimate and perceived to be legitimate by those affected by them. The will must 
exist on the part of the intervenors to promote and support the effort. The system 
must be robust enough to manage it. Resources must exist to make it possible. 
Personal jurisdiction must be acquired over the actors. The prospect of succeeding 
must be real; that is, there must be a realistic chance that evidence admissible in a 
properly constituted court, available to be used in trial, is going to be sufficient in 
quality and quantity to result in conviction that will support meaningful and 
enforceable punishment and survive appeal. The process must advance at a pace, 
both with regard to charges and to their ultimate resolution, that promotes rather 
than corrodes real legitimacy and the perception of legitimacy.  
Accountability is also an international legal obligation. The choice of criminal 
prosecution for achieving it is already prescribed by treaty and convention. What 
the impact is or might be is irrelevant. People must be prosecuted because 
international obligations undertaken by the state must be honored.12 This duty to 
                                                
12 See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (1949), art. 
1 (i.e., “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of 
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to 
prevent and to punish.”); see also Geneva Convention IV: Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, art. 146 ( i.e., “The High Contracting 
Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions 
for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the 
present Convention defined in the following Article. Each High Contracting Party shall 
be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have 
ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of 
their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with 
the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High 
Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima 
facie case.”); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, art. 4(1) and (2) (i.e. “(1) Each State Party shall ensure that all 
acts of torture are offences under its criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to 
commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes complicity or participation 
in torture. (2) Each State Party shall make these offences punishable by appropriate 
penalties which take into account their grave nature.”). 
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prosecute is presumably based on the assumption made at the time the conventions 
were agreed to that there is a political and practical, as well as a humanitarian, 
benefit to be derived from punishing violations of the norms associated with the 
international obligations. It is a legal as opposed to a moral, political, or practical 
imperative.  
In light of all of this, aside from being the human thing to do, it seems 
intuitive that holding people accountable for committing atrocity by prosecuting 
them criminally, notwithstanding the problems that may create for negotiating an 
end to conflict and relief for intervenors, is an essential proven feature of the 
process that must be undertaken to achieve durable long-term resolution of the 
tensions that promoted conflict and contributed to violence in the first place. If 
conduct that violates universally recognized norms is not dealt with by means that 
attract the confidence of those affected by atrocity; if people are not held 
accountable for what they do in conflict that violates those norms; if harm done is 
not acknowledged openly; if victims aren’t at least given a chance to confront 
those who did them harm in a controlled setting where the accused do not have the 
upper hand; and if corrosive narratives built on inaccurate or manipulated facts are 
allowed to go unchecked and uncorrected; there is little hope for a lasting end to 
conflict and a lingering likelihood of future atrocity.  
 
IV.  LEGITIMACY 
 
Assume for purposes of discussion that the problems I’ve suggested and 
others can be resolved, that existing modes of liability (e.g. aiding and abetting) are 
not adequate or not available to hold those who engage in atrocity crime 
accountable for their acts. Assume as well that a new mode of liability is needed to 
reach those who simply observe atrocity and fail to intervene regardless how futile 
the intervention is likely to be. The expectations that such a mode of liability will 
raise for victims and survivors of atrocity must then be considered. The effects of 
those expectations on the system given the task of prosecuting atrocity crime and 
on those in it who are responsible for making the decision to prosecute must also 
be examined. The consequences occasioned by the loss of credibility and 
legitimacy that will attend a decision not to use the “bystander” mode of liability in 
an atrocity crimes case must be weighed. The damage that may be done to the 
political will to engage in atrocity crime prosecution in the first place must be 
taken into account. The long-term effect on doing atrocity crime prosecutions must 
also be considered.  
Answering these inquiries raises questions about how prosecutors decide what 
and who to prosecute for atrocity crimes. Given the number of victims, the number 
of people involved in one way or another actually doing the acts that constitute the 
atrocity; given the intensity of the crimes committed and the impact of those 
crimes across communities, lasting impact that lingers in narratives that live on for 
generations in some cases; given the number of direct perpetrators who are viable 
candidates for prosecution for their role in atrocity crimes; given the resources 
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available to attempt to address accountability for those crimes; given the political 
will that must exist to enable the prosecution of atrocity crimes; and given the time 
it takes to prosecute even the most rudimentary atrocity crimes case, selecting and 
prioritizing cases is a fundamental concern for a prosecutor tasked with 
investigating and prosecuting atrocity crime. The prosecutor is the gate through 
which all of this is done. It is his or her decision that initiates the commitment of 
resources, engages the system created to investigate, prosecute and punish atrocity 
crimes, and puts political will to the test in every case. How is that decision to be 
made? And how will that decision affect legitimacy?  
As noted earlier, one of the primary goals of atrocity crimes prosecution is to 
hold those responsible for such crimes accountable by achieving legitimate 
outcomes that are perceived and accepted as legitimate by those they affect. 
Legitimacy is a complex word; one often carelessly used and, like justice, one 
subject to a myriad of definitions and applications and understood, if understood at 
all, in a variety of ways depending on a person’s self-interest; that is how he or she 
has been or is or is likely to be impacted by events and circumstances and what he 
or she stands to gain or lose as it relates to those circumstances and events.  
As a practitioner responsible for playing a role in achieving outcomes that are 
legitimate and perceived and accepted as such, I must give the term basic content if 
it is to serve as a guide for decision-making for me and those I supervise, and for 
the courts and constituencies I serve. My definition is a practical, useful, and 
useable one; not one intended to be comprehensive. It is a definition arrived at by 
experience and reflection, not study.  
With that in mind, I define legitimate outcomes for my purposes to mean 
results achieved by applying substantive law that is consistent with generally 
recognized international norms.13 These outcomes must be achieved by institutions 
and by processes governed by fundamental internationally recognized due process 
and human rights norms.14 They must be consistent with domestic substantive law, 
norms and practices that are not in conflict with or can be reconciled with 
international norms to ensure they are accepted and enforceable. Likewise, 
outcomes must be consistent with the beliefs and the religious and cultural laws, 
norms and practices of the communities affected by them to the extent they can be 
reconciled with international norms.  
                                                
13 See, e.g., Nuremberg Principles, Chapter LX, Agreement and Charter, August 8, 
1945, Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International 
Conference on Military Trials, London (1945), http://loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/ 
jackson-rpt-military-trials.pdf; ICTY and ICTR Statutes; the Rome Statute; Genocide 
Convention, Convention Against Torture, Geneva Conventions and Protocols; JENNIFER 
TRAHAN, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A TOPICAL DIGEST OF 
THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA (Human Rights Watch, 2006). 
14 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights; European Convention on Human 
Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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Legitimate outcomes are those achieved by independent institutions15 and 
actors16 competent to conduct their business in accord with international norms, 
domestic practices and norms, and local beliefs and practices, and able to reconcile 
any conflicts and differences in ways that are accepted by those affected by the 
outcomes. Institutions and actors must not succumb to influence (i.e. political, 
financial, ideological) that causes them to render decisions on anything other than 
the merits (i.e. relevant facts developed to the extent needed to enable a 
meaningful decision; an application of law that reflects knowledge and 
understanding of relevant law and practice; decisions that are reasonably consistent 
with how similar matters have been resolved in the past and defensible as a 
reasonable extension of existing law if not). Legitimate outcomes are enforceable 
because the means exist now, and in the future, to enforce them, and because they 
meet the reasonable expectations of those they affect—the key word reasonable—
and thus are likely to be accepted.  
In atrocity crimes prosecution then, outcomes, whether they are achieved in 
international tribunals, domestic tribunals, or in the variety of hybrid courts and 
tribunals that have emerged since the creation of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), are likely to be legitimate if achieved in institutions, by actors, and through 
means that satisfy the criteria I’ve described. The remainder of this Article focuses 
on but one of those criterion—the reasonable expectations of those the outcomes 
affect. 
 
V.  RAISING AND MANAGING EXPECTATIONS 
 
During the question and answer session at a recent program put on by The 
Hague Institute to examine the European Union’s contribution to achieving “a 
more just global order,”17 one of the attendees, in the context of a discussion of the 
use of criminal investigations and prosecutions to hold actors accountable for 
misconduct in conflict, asked, “Who can stop the holocaust in Aleppo?” The 
implication was clear and expressed an expectation that is all too common; that 
investigating and prosecuting atrocity crime can stop misconduct in conflict, even 
misconduct as wide-ranging and as catastrophic as what has produced devastation 
and suffering in the civilian population of Aleppo on a scale and intensity that is as 
great or greater than any conflict related human catastrophe since the end of World 
War II.  
                                                
15 See, e.g., Mt. Scopus Approved Revised International Standards of Judicial 
Independence (Mar. 19, 2008), http://www.cristidanilet.ro/docs/MtScopusInternational 
Standrds.pdf. 
16 See, e.g., International Association of Prosecutors, Standards of Professional 
Responsibility and Statement of the Essential Duties and Rights of Prosecutors (Apr. 23, 
1999). 
17 The Hague Institute, “The EU’s Contribution to a More Just Global Order,” Panel 
Discussion (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/ 
latest-insights/latest-insights/news-brief/the-eus-contribution-to-a-more-just-global-order. 
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Recent efforts by the United States, Britain and others in the United Nations 
Security Council to bring desperately needed attention to the plight of civilians in 
Aleppo, illustrate both the value, the danger and the challenge posed by indulging 
the assumption that investigating and prosecuting atrocity crime can somehow end 
a human catastrophe like the one that has occurred in Syria. On September 25, 
2016, British Ambassador to the United Nations Matthew Rycroft, speaking in an 
emergency Sunday session of the Security Council called to address the murderous 
siege of Aleppo, observed: 
 
So this Council must now do more than demand or urge. We must now 
decide. What can we do to enforce an immediate end to the 
bombardment of Aleppo and other civilian areas in Syria? We must 
decide what we can do now to end the siege, to end the chokehold that is 
preventing aid getting in. And in doing so, we must speak loudly and 
clearly that there will be accountability for these crimes and so many 
more – including the barbaric, despicable use of chemical weapons by 
the regime against its own people. That is the only way to stop the 
suffering. And it is the only way for Russia to atone for its deplorable 
actions in Syria.18 
 
Ambassador Rycroft’s remarks were preceded earlier in September by a statement 
he made in a session of the United Nations Trusteeship Council on the subject of 
the “Responsibility to Protect,” a statement calibrated partly to address the 
darkening situation in Syria and partly to call for action against Da’esh19 brutality 
in Iraq and Syria. In the remarks he made on that occasion he noted: 
 
Part of our Responsibility to Protect lies in ensuring that those who seek 
to harm civilians know that impunity is not an option. In July, British 
Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson announced plans for a UK-led 
campaign to hold Da’esh to account. I am pleased to say it [sic] today we 
will officially launch that campaign during the high level week of 
UNGA (UN General Assembly) this year. 
Holding these heinous individuals to account will send a strong signal to 
those who seek to harm civilians. It’s part of our commitment, not only 
to the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect but also, and more 
                                                
18 Ambassador Matthew Rycroft, “It is difficult to deny that Russia is partnering with 
the Syrian regime to carry out war crimes,” UN Security Council, 25 September 2016, 
accessed on May 15, 2017.  
19 “Da’esh” is a transliteration of the Arabic acronym formed of the same words that 
make up “I.S.I.S,” the acronym for the “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria,” in English. Alice 
Guthrie, Decoding Daesh: Why is the new name for ISIS so hard to understand?, FREE 
WORD CENTRE (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.freewordcentre.com/ 
explore/daesh-isis-media-alice-guthrie. 
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importantly, to the survivors and the victims and those who have lost 
loved ones to Da’esh’s brutality.20 
 
Though clearly his remarks were not limited to suggesting that holding individuals 
accountable for actions causing the kind of damage and civilian suffering in Syria 
and Iraq that has occurred there in the last several years is necessary to bring about 
an end to the human catastrophe the world is watching, the implication is the same 
as the one embedded in the question asked during the event at The Hague Institute: 
investigating and prosecuting atrocity crime can stop ongoing misconduct.   
The expectations implicit in the foregoing follow from the promise 
encouraged by the Rome Statute, by the work of the ICTY and the ICC, as 
imperfect as it is, and by the creation of hybrid tribunals and courts to deal with 
atrocity crimes, experiments in the application and enforcement of now nearly 
universally accepted norms governing conflict; that is that investigating and 
prosecuting the crimes the world witnesses for itself every day through the media 
will bring an end to the misconduct and the suffering it causes. 
The promise, of course, is a hollow one; a promise that cannot be kept. The 
political reasons for elevating discussion of events in Syria and Iraq to one of 
atrocity crimes are many—and justified. Not the least of the reasons for doing it is 
to put nations supporting those committing atrocity on notice that they are on the 
verge of becoming international outlaws subject to sanctions – a potential deterrent 
to continuing support. But talk of accountability in this context assumes both a will 
and a means for investigating the actions of those engaged in the conduct and the 
existence of mechanisms for presenting proof sufficient to support criminal 
convictions and meaningful and enforceable punishments. Only then can there be 
some prospect that the outcomes produced, outcomes consistent with international 
norms, will be accepted by those affected by them and enforceable. Without the 
possibility of any of that occurring, calls for accountability to have little, if any, 
force.  
Further, accountability has not yet resulted in meaningful prevention or 
avoidance of atrocity. The threat of accountability has had little demonstrable 
effect on ongoing atrocity. Though in the absence of hard proof and in the face of 
enormous suffering, there is no reason not to pursue effective investigations and 
prosecutions of atrocity crime, even while it is happening, in hopes of affecting 
misconduct in current and future conflicts.21 As noted above, accountability is 
significant, important, even necessary, for reasons that transcend deterrence, 
prevention or avoidance, but managing expectations for what investigating and 
prosecuting atrocity can accomplish is important if corroding its credibility and the 
                                                
20 Ambassador Matthew Rycroft, “Part of our Responsibility to Protect lies in 
ensuring that those who seek to harm civilians know that impunity is not an option,” UN 
Trusteeship Council, 06 September 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
speeches/part-of-our-responsibility-to-protect-lies-in-ensuring-that-those-who-seek-to-
harm-civilians-know-that-impunity-is-not-an-option, accessed on May 15, 2017. 
21 See JENNIFER SCHENSE, LINDA CARTER, ED., TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP 
BACK: THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS (2016).  
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legitimacy of efforts to pursue atrocity investigations and prosecutions is to be 
avoided. It is also important to ensure that valuable and limited political will and 
the relatively scant resources that are available for doing anything about 
investigating and prosecuting atrocity crimes are not exhausted by efforts that 
endeavor to meet inflated expectations of what can be done; expectations that 
experience tells us simply cannot be met.  
Nonetheless, when those affected by atrocity, including victims and survivors, 
those providing aid and assistance, states affected by the consequences of atrocity, 
including the migration of great populations of displaced persons, and regions 
affected by ongoing political, cultural, and economic instability resulting from 
atrocity, as well as those otherwise interested in or engaged with the subject, begin 
to talk about accountability assumptions are often made about the prospect of 
investigating, prosecuting and punishing those responsible, assumptions that are 
often inflated and not well-informed by reality. If such assumptions are 
encouraged, unless managed properly, and even despite well-intentioned efforts to 
manage them, they invariably become expectations: I expect people will be 
prosecuted for the suffering I endured; for what my family and community 
experienced. I expect people to be convicted and imprisoned. I expect to be made 
whole again by the process. In one way or another what happened to me and my 
family, my community, will be acknowledged and dealt with, and a trial is what I 
am led to expect will do that for me.  
For political purposes in conflict torn regions, creating and exploiting such 
expectations may serve as a way to allow intervenors or those who prevail in a 
conflict to avoid dealing directly with the effects of atrocity and its long-term 
implications. This they do by shifting the risk associated with atrocity investigation 
and prosecution to the criminal justice system even in places where the system is 
not sufficiently competent, not adequately resourced, nor robust or credible 
enough, or independent enough, to produce outcomes that will be truly legitimate 
let alone be perceived as legitimate by those they affect. In some cases, that may 
be deliberate; done to keep the criminal justice system weak; done to protect those 
who prevailed and perhaps intervenors as well from being pursued for their part in 
atrocity. In others, just an accident resulting from the uncertainty and instability 
that follows conflict in which atrocity has occurred.  
In situations following conflict marked by atrocity, poorly informed 
assumptions are often made about the value of using the need to investigate, 
prosecute, and punish atrocity crime as justification for funding the development of 
a conflict-torn state’s criminal justice system. In such cases even well-meaning 
intervenors and developers fail to acknowledge that atrocity crime is so unique and 
so deeply woven into the political dynamics of a post-conflict state, into the 
resolution of the conflict, and into the narratives that accompany conflict, 
narratives that persist long after the killing ends, that asking the domestic criminal 
justice system to take responsibility for investigating, prosecuting, and punishing 
atrocity is much more likely to put crushing strain on that system and corrode 
respect for its institutions and the rule of law than it is to encourage the 
rehabilitation and improvement needed in order for the system to be able to deal 
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with the demands placed on it by ordinary crime, including serious crime affecting 
public order. Development of assumptions in these situations as in others is often a 
prescription for failure.  
Managing the subject of atrocity investigation and prosecution by not 
allowing assumptions to be made that harden into expectations regarding how 
much can be done to deal with atrocity is essential to avoid disappointment that 
will affect the legitimacy of any effort to address atrocity crimes. This is done by 
being realistic about what should be expected. It starts by educating those likely to 
be affected by, or interested in, the outcomes about the reach of the mandate 
investigators, prosecutors and courts have to work with.22 Properly selecting and 
prioritizing what can be dealt with and being as objective and transparent as 
possible about how that will be done is essential.23 The affected public must be 
informed of the limits and restrictions on the process, including the standards that 
will be used to charge crimes,24 the criteria that will apply to deciding whether a 
plea of guilty will be considered,25 and how other features of the process will be 
managed.26 
                                                
22 Taylor, supra note 4. 
23 See, e.g., Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Special Department for 
War Crimes, Prosecution Guidelines, 5. Prioritization, Practice Direction (09 February 
2009), reproduced at Annex A. The prioritization guideline and practice direction is one of 
several such instructions produced by the Deputy Chief Prosecutor and Head of the Special 
Department for War Crimes and adopted by the Special Department to regularize and 
standardize essential prosecution functions and to bring them into compliance with 
international standards. The prioritization guideline was used together with a 
comprehensive historical study of the conflict to attempt to achieve a more strategic, 
objective and transparent selection of cases from the confusion of complaints and matters 
that were competing for the limited resources of the Special Department for War Crimes 
and the War Crimes Chamber of the State Court. The goal of this and the other guidelines 
was to ensure greater legitimacy for the process and for the outcomes achieved by the 
prosecution and the courts and to help promote the perception of legitimacy among those 
affected by the process and the outcomes. Extensive public messaging was done to inform 
the general public about the guideline and the study and about how they were being used. 
Efforts were also made, successfully in most cases, to enlist the support of victim groups 
and leaders for the process the guidelines established. The guidelines were effective for a 
time, but were largely abandoned after the international leadership of the Special 
Department for War Crimes was withdrawn from the State Prosecutor’s Office at the end 
of 2009; see also ROBERT CRYER, PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: SELECTIVITY 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL REGIMES (2005).  
24 See, e.g., Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Special Department for 
War Crimes, Prosecution Guidelines, 1. Charging, Practice Direction (13 January 2009), 
reproduced at Annex B.  
25 See, e.g., Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Special Department for 
War Crimes, Prosecution Guidelines, 2. Pleas and Plea Bargaining, Practice Direction (15 
April 2009), reproduced at Annex C.  
26 See, e.g., Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Special Department for 
War Crimes, Prosecution Guidelines, 3. Immunity, Practice Direction (27 May 2007), 
reproduced at Annex D.  
728 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
 
VI.  PROVING SOMEONE IS A CULPABLE “BYSTANDER” 
 
Aside from the inherent problem of preserving the ability to investigate, 
prosecute, and punish atrocity crime for the most worthy offenders by not creating 
expectations that promise too much, assuming again for purposes of discussion 
that liability for crime is extended so that it reaches a “bystander” to atrocity crime, 
as a practitioner contemplating the prosecution of someone based on “bystander” 
liability, how to prove the mode of liability will be a serious concern. As noted 
earlier, existing modes of liability for atrocity crimes have a well-developed 
jurisprudence.27 Each requires proof of acts or omissions that either are the 
criminal act or omission or significantly contribute to the commission of a crime. 
Each requires that the actor have requisite knowledge of the circumstances in 
which he or she is acting or failing to act; that is, the person is aware that a crime is 
being committed. And each requires the actor to act with criminal intent; that is, 
knowing that his or her acts or omissions are contributing to the commission of the 
crime and intending same. For each recognized existing mode of liability then, the 
prosecution must, in varying forms and degrees, prove acts or omissions, 
knowledge and intent.28 
The existing mode of liability that is the most likely candidate for use in the 
case of someone who might be classed as a “bystander,” is aiding and abetting. If 
each of the elements of aiding and abetting can be proven, there is no need for a 
new mode of liability—at least for purposes of holding someone criminally 
accountable for his or her acts or failures to act in the face of atrocity. The wisdom 
of using an aiding and abetting theory for such prosecutions is another question 
answered in part by the jurisprudence that has grown up around the aiding and 
abetting theory and by the same considerations regarding expectations that are 
discussed above.  
The question is what “acts” or “omissions” will the prosecutor be required to 
prove to establish that a person participated in an atrocity crime as a “bystander.” 
What is the actus reus? Presence? By definition, atrocity crimes involve broad and 
deep criminal activity comprising multiple acts committed by numerous actors that 
together result in significant loss of life, human suffering, loss of individual 
dignity, cultural, religious and economic destruction, dislocation and instability, 
and the large-scale loss or expropriation of private and public property. How then 
is a prosecutor to prove someone was “present” for purposes of an atrocity crime? 
Present at one of the single acts that is part of the larger pattern of conduct that is 
the atrocity? Present at many? Has one acted or omitted to act because he or she 
didn’t go to places where acts were being committed to protest or intervene? 
Stayed home? What other acts or omissions will qualify?  
If an aiding and abetting theory won’t work, the question is what will the 
prosecutor be required to prove for a person to be found to be a culpable 
                                                
27 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 6. 
28 Id.  
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“bystander”? Will it be enough to show that the single act or the acts witnessed 
were forbidden predicate offenses that were part of a larger attack on a protected 
community? Perhaps that an act or omission the person knows about, but does not 
witness, intentionally avoids was part of the larger attack? How far from the actual 
offense will the prosecutor be allowed to reach to pick off those who knew, but 
simply did nothing? Must it be proven that the “bystander” intended not only that 
the act or omission he or she is observing or has knowledge of was part of a greater 
pattern of conduct that was the atrocity crime but that he or she also shared the 
intent of the perpetrator? How will that be proven? Is it enough to prove that the 
person knew that the act or omission was part of something larger, didn’t object to 
it, may even wanted it to occur, didn’t do anything to interfere with it?  
What contribution must the actor be proven to have made to the commission 
of the atrocity? Will it be enough for one to contribute in some way to a single act 
that is part of the larger pattern of conduct? Watching as books are thrown into the 
fire by others when a library is being destroyed to persecute members of a religious 
community as part of a widespread or systematic attack on that community? 
Encouragement? What kind of encouragement will be enough to be a culpable 
contribution to the crime? Saying nothing as the books are thrown? Doing nothing 
to stop it?  
What defenses should the prosecutor anticipate? How does the prosecutor 
answer the claim that to act under the circumstances would have been futile, 
perhaps resulting in death or serious injury to the “bystander?” Is one compelled to 
act, does one have a duty to act, when he or she has a reasonable belief that acting 
would not prevent or even mitigate the effects of the crimes he or she is aware of 
or observes? Must one risk his or her life under the circumstances? Will the failure 
to act in such cases excuse liability? How does the prosecutor prove that acting 
would not have been futile under the circumstances or that the accused’s safety or 
that of others would not have been jeopardized if he or she did act?  
Proof problems will almost certainly discourage sensible prosecutors from 
using the “bystander” mode of liability in atrocity crimes cases, just as they have 
made prosecutor’s reluctant to use aiding and abetting as a theory in atrocity 
crimes cases, but that will not lower the expectation of victims, survivors and 
others that it will be used to prosecute those who saw, who knew, and who did 
nothing, who simply stood by when atrocity was being committed. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
It is imperative when talking about accountability and the enforcement of 
internationally recognized and accepted criminal norms governing conflict, when 
talking about investigating and prosecuting atrocity crime, not to raise expectations 
that have little or no chance of being met. Expanding the modes of liability to 
reach bystanders has the potential to raise such expectations, pushing the range of 
subjects that victims, survivors and others with an interest in the outcome of 
atrocity crime investigations and prosecutions expect will be prosecuted out 
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beyond those as to whom there is likely to be political will to prosecute and 
certainly beyond the capacity and resources likely to be available to prosecute 
them. Inevitably, confidence in the process for holding people accountable for 
atrocity will be corroded and the legitimacy of the outcomes achieved by the 
process will be compromised. Holding out the prospect that too much can be done 
is likely to be the enemy of being able to do enough. 
